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ADDRESS BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND (D-SC) "ON PROPOSED EXTE 
OF CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, SEPI'EMBER J'-f , 1959. 
Mr. President, I am convinced beyond any shadow of a doubt ; 
I 
that the Senate is making no contribution to the welfare of the 
country /by even considering an extension of the Civil Rights 
Commission. The consideration of such an extension would have been 
even more unfortunate had it been undertaken without having 
available to us the report of the Civil Rights Commission. 
In reading the report of this Commission, Senators should 
keep in mind that this is the report of a commission which was 
promoted as a group which would deal exclusively with voting rights. 
I do not believe that any of us were deceived in 1957, and I know 
that I was not so deceived. The Commission has, of course, 
presumed to enter into a discussion of race relations in the fields 
of education and housing, as well as voting . Obviously, the 
information on which the Commissioners base their discussion could 
not be dignified by calling it a study . 
I shall review briefly what I can only describe as the 
illogical ramblings and babblings of unsound thinking ; and from 
time to time, I shall also note with pleasure that there are those 
among the Commissioners who indicate by their individual opinions 
and statements contained in the report that they, unlike the staff 
and the other Commissioners, have not completely lost touch with 
reality. 
In the field of voting the Commission made a total of five 
so-called findings and recommendations. I shall merely note at 
this point that Commissioner Battle's dissent on all five findings 
and recommendations indicates that the Gommission was not without 
a rational thinker among its group, had it chosen to follow the 
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~eadership of good judgment and clear thinking 
The first finding of the Commission in the field of voting 
is believable to me. Obviously, the Commissioners who joined in 
the remaining findings and recommendations in the voting area did 
not believe it themselves, however, for if they had, they could 
have drawn no conclusions whatsoever--much less any recommendations . 
I quote the first two sentences of the first finding of the 
Commission: 
"The Commission finds that there is a general 
deficiency of information pertinent to the phenomenon 
of non-voting. There is a general lack of reliable 
information on voting according to race, color, or 
national origin, and there is no single repository of 
the fragmentary information available." 
It is obvious that if one believes that this finding of the 
Commission is correct, it would be senseless to attach any 
credibility to any additional part of the Commission's report on 
voting.. 
The Commission recommends that the Bureau of Census undertake 
a nation-wide compilation of registration and voting statistics to 
include a count of individuals by race, color, and national origin 
who are registered and the frequence of their voting in the past 
ten years . 
Mr. President, I heartily indorse this recommendation . I 
do not believe that anyone could conceive of a more practical and 
a more suitable replacement for the Civil Rights Commission than 
the census suggested by the Commission itself . It should be quite 
apparent that until the information which the Commission finds to 
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be practically non-existent can be compiled, no sensible study nor 
logical conclusion can be accomplished. 
Mr. President, had the Commission stopped at this point in 
its report, it would have accomplished more good than I have ever 
conceived that it could do. I say this with full awareness that 
the Commission's conclusion, arrived at after two years of 
existence, could have been reached by any logical man after a few 
casual inquiries. Unfortunately, the Commission did not stop at 
this point; and in the remainder of the report, those of the 
Commission who advance specific proposals confirm beyond a doubt 
that this Commission has contributed and is contributing more to 
racial unrest, tension and bad relations than any other force or 
factor which has been conceived by Congress in modern times. 
Now, Mr. President, let us look at other so-called findings 
and recommendations of the Commission, concerning which the 
Commission has admitted there is practically no information avail­
able on which to base any finding or recommendation. Some of the 
Commissioners-Xil~IJC:llllllQ~~IXIIXJI.IXlflialll*MXllXllXI.IIIlllllXll 
UIU~~X-made a finding that there is a lack of uniformity 
of laws with respect to the preservation of voting records. 
Mr. President, this is indeed a profound revelation. It is profound 
in spite of the fact that it is what our forefathers and the drafters 
of the Constitution intended in the first place, and what is 
basically inherent in our whole system of government, in the second 
place. The very fact that we do not yet have a totalitarian 
government should have been enough in itself to indicate that the 
States still had the right to have differences in their laws on a 
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subject which is exclusively within the sovereign power and 
authority of each of the several States. 
It is in the recommendation, Mr. President, that either the 
utter irresponsibility, or abysmal ignorance, of those Commissioners 
who joined in this recommendation stands out. These Commissioners 
recommended that the Federal Government enact legislation requiring 
the maintenance of all voting records for a period of five years 
and that such voting records be open to public inspection. Such 
a statute would obviously be unconstitutional, but the remainder 
of this report proves unquestionably that such a consideration 
plays no part in the judgment of the avid integrationist members 
of the Commission. 
The third item listed as a "recommendation" under the 
discussion of voting is, to say the least, a confusing compilation 
of words lacking not only a complete thought, but any thought at 
all. The discussion called "background", when combined with the 
so-called findings, convey a rather hazy impression that the 
Commission is lamenting the fact that some private citizens do 
not choose to serve on registration boards. 
This discussion mentions the fact that in some instances, 
some members of the boards resigned their post, and State officials 
responsible for filling the vacancies have delayed in doing so. 
The Commission concludes that such conduct, presumably by the 
resignees and the State officials, is "arbitrary, capricious and 
without legal cause or justification." To remedy the situation, 
if indeed the Commission has any particular situation in mind, 
the Commission recommends that an additional section be added to 
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Part IV of the so-called Civil Rights Act of 1957 to prohibit 
any person from being a non-feasor "under color of State law, 
arbitrarily, without legal justification or cause, " if any such 
non-feasance results in somebody being unable to register. 
Consideration of the lack of constitutional authority for the 
Federal Government to interfere in State matters is again belied 
by this so-called recommendation. 
The next discussion of the Commission included under the 
topic of voting has nothing whatsoever to do with voting--and this, 
incidentally, is in line with the organization of the rest of 
this report and the thinking which spawned it . At this point the 
report goes into the matter of witnesses who decline to testify 
before this insidious body . As in so many instances, the so-called 
recommendations have, not surprisingly, attempted to justify 
expanded authority for the Commission. In ·this particular instance, 
those of the Commission-~lUt'J(1!ffli~JC:11l:ffll:~*--who joined in 
this recommendation, would have the Commission authorized to apply 
directly to the appropriate United States District Court for 
orders enforcing subpoenas where the subpoenaed person declined to 
testify . 
After this diversion into matters more extraneous even than 
the other parts of the report, the Commission returned to a 
discussion of persons declining to serve on registration boards. 
At this point, there is an additional so-called recommendation which 
surpasses by a considerable extent in complete disregard of the 
Constitution and our federated republican form of government any­
thing that has come previously in the report. This proposal is 
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for the appointment of a federal registrar who would determine 
~, 
what persons under the terms of State law were eligible to vote and 
would dictate the registration lists to the State boards of registra­
tion. Such a proposal would not only be unconstitutional, but 
woul~ in fact, establish a federal dictatorship--if indeed it could 
be enforced. One would think that the authors of such a proposal 
were existing mentally in Reconstruction days and writing regula­
tions for the conduct of civil affairs by the occupying Union 
troops. It might come as a surprise to the authors of this proposal 
and others of a similar mind, but the fact is that the South is no 
longer a conquered province. Further, the South has never been, 
nor will it ever be, conquered by the enactment of such proposals. 
Next, the report, apparently for the first time, acknowledges 
the existence of the United States Constitution and, even more 
surprisingly, the acknowledgment is by the three most avid 
integrationist Connnissioners. Their acknowledgment, however, is 
only in passing and for the sole purpose of zeroing in on the 
target they forewith propose to destroy. Their proposal for 
destruction embodies a constitutional amendment which would 
transfer all substantial control and authority over the eligibility 
of voters from the States, where it now resides, to the Federal 
Government, where it can only reside in tyranny. 
I would note at this point that three of the Connnissioners 
opposed the proposal of such a constitutional amendment, and it is 
to their everlasting credit that they recognize the inherent 
danger of such a proposal. 
Before passing from this particular proposal, it is worthy 
to note, in connection with the rationale which prompted the 
- 6 -
proposal, how the three avid integrationists justified the elimina­
tion of any literacy tests from voting eligibility requirements. 
First, the Commission noted that the march of education has 
almost eliminated illiteracy. This they followed with the following 
unbelievably unrealistic rationale: 
"In a nation dedicated to the full development 
of every citizen's human potential, there is no excuse 
for whatever illtteracy that may remain. Ratification 
of the proposed amendment would, we believe, provide an 
additional incentive for its total elimination. Mean­
while, abundant information about political candidates 
and issues is available to all by way of television 
and radio." 
Such shallowness of mental process could only stem from the 
deepest of bias. 
Mr. President, before turning to the next Portion of what 
someone in a fit of delusion has mistitled a "report", I would 
remind the Senate that the first so-called finding under the voting 
section recognizes that there is an almost complete absence of 
information on this particular subject. Nothing could better prove 
the truth of this first so-called finding than the remainder of 
the section on voting. ' 
In the portion of the report which purports to deal with the 
field of so-called civil rights and education, the Commission does 
not find, but certainly indicates by its language, that there is 
also a dearth of knowledge--in the minds of those who wrote this 
report, at least--on this particular feature. The initial so-called 
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finding on education by some Commissioners--again, there is no 
way of telling how many--is to the effect that there is no 
"guidance" for those communities or school officials who might 
desire to integrate their schools. This is followed by what is 
titled a "recommendation" that the Civil Rights Commission be 
authorized to collect and make available various schemes for 
integrating the races in the public schools, in addition to 
authorizing the Civil Rights Commission to establish an ¥advisory 
and conciliation service" for school integration. 
Mr. President, in my State at least, I can assure the Senate 
that there is no desire--much less demand--for the advice or 
conciliation efforts, nor for the integration schemes, of this or 
any other federal commission. I doubt seriously whether any such 
desire exists anywhere. This is just another of those self-serving, 
self-perpetuating, empire-building justifications . 
The only other proposal which is titled a "recommendation" 
in the field of education is to the effect that the Office of 
Education and the Bureau of Census conduct a school census to show 
the number and race of students in public schools. This proposal 
is included as an answer to the surprising finding that in agencies 
of the Federal Government and in most State agencies, the records 
are not kept separate on the basis of race so that there is no 
way in which to tell how many of the students are of what color. 
The agitators in the race relations field have long demanded, and 
apparently finally achieved, the abolition of a most practical and 
realistic device--the indication of a person's race on his record. 
Rather than acknowledge that the abolition of this practice was a 
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mistake in the first place, the race agitators would now have the 
records duplicated with the accent on race by a federal agency. 
Quite frankly, Mr. President, such mental gynmastics repulse me. 
Once again, Mr. President, the three avid integrationists on 
the Commission take off on their own proposals on education at this 
point in the report. In effect they would have all financial 
assistance of the Federal Government tied to integration practices 
in--and I quote-- 11 both publicly and privately supported" institu­
tions of higher education. Even if the Fourteenth Amendment did 
apply in such a way that public segregated schools could not be 
maintained and this is emphatically not the case--even the errant 
and constitutionally unconscious occupants of the Supreme Court 
admit that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to State action; 
and indeed in the discussion of their own proposal, these three 
Commissioners parrot the words "only State action" but apparently 
without the slightest understanding of the meaning of this phrase. 
The remaining three members of the Commission wrote their 
best dissent on this point, stating that they could not "endorse 
a program of economic coercion" and that this proposal which dealt 
with institutions of higher education was completely without the 
jurisdiction of the Commission under the terms of the Act by which 
it was created. The dissent also reveals that the staff studies 
of the Commission were limited exclusively in the field of education 
to elementary and secondary public schools, not private at any 
level, nor institutions of higher education, whether public or 
private. This is but another indication, if indeed any additional 
indication is necessary, that the entirety of the report is a 
matter of conjecture rather than any intelligent studious approach. 
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On the subject of housing, I gather that although there are 
a number of proposals which are entitled reccmmendations contained 
in this section of the report, none of them has the support of a 
majority of the Commission, and, therefore, could hardly be 
considered recommendations. The proposals themselves are confusingly 
worded, ineptly expressed, and hazy in content. 
One of the so-called findings which should be of particular 
interest to the Congress is the fact that the Federal Government 
plays a major role in housing. I am happy to note that by virtue 
of this body's action recently, the Federal Government will play a 
slightly less major role in housing this year than was earlier 
supposed. 
The proposals themselves are easily summarized. They would 
have the President issue Executive Orders to enforce integration 
of the races in housing in which the Federal Government had any 
part or participation. In addition, the proposals would have the 
Federal Government go much further into the fields of public 
housing and urban renewal. 
These proposals are no surprise to me. I have long realized 
that the race agitators propose to use housing as a tool to mix 
the races, The three members of the Commission who dissented 
summed up the proposals quite aptly as suggesting 11 fixed programs 
of mixing the races anywhere and everywhere regardless of the 
wishes of either race. 11 In their proposals the avid integrationists 
on the Commission spell out the methods by which housing can be 
used to integrate the races. These are interesting to note because 
often 
their use is more/by surreptitious means, and here we have them 
spelled out in the open. For instance, they would adopt a policy 
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of "scatteration 11 in public housing by sprinkling public housing 
units throughout residential areas and installing in them persons 
of a race different from those living in the community. In this 
connection it is interesting to note that these Commissioners are 
as much concerned with the problem of getting white people to live 
in all-Negro units as they are with getting scme Negroes to live 
in all-white units . They recognize, it seems , that the members of 
neither race ordinarily desire to force themselves on the other. 
Mr . President, the policy of "scatteration" is nothing new 
to the Congress of the United States . I distinctly recall that 
such a policy was incorporated in the Omnibus Housing Bill reported 
by the Banking and Currency Committee of the Senate in 1958 but 
was deleted by an amendment I offered on the floor. 
Mr. President, this report should be read by every member of 
this body before he votes on the question of continuing the 
existence of this Commission. A knowledge of what recommendations 
were made generally or, indeed, whether there were recommendations 
at all is not sufficient. There is much revealing language in this 
report for all its confusion and obscurity. I would like to give 
two illustrations. 
As I mentioned when I was reviewing the section of the report 
which purported to deal with voting, the report took a diversion 
to lament the fact that some citizens were disinclined to serve on 
State registration boards. In this discussion the report attributes 
to such persons as one reason for their refusal to serve the "fear 
of being 'hounded' by the United States Civil Rights Commission." 
What further proof could be needed that the Commission itself is a 
principal instrument of racial strife and voting difficulties? 
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Even more revealing with regard to the attitude of some of the 
more avid integrationists on the Commission itself is a statement 
by Commissioner Hesburgh. I do not believe I have ever heard the 
Marxist philosophy more succinctly stated than in the words of 
Commissioner Hesburgh in his comments near the end of the report, 
where he said: "Again, the use of public money for the benefit 
of all, equal opportunity, is a cardinal principle. 11 
The question before this body is whether to continue an 
ill-conceived instrument of racial strife, wielded under the 
influence of philosophies alien to all that true and patriotic 
Americans hold dear. 
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When the so-called civil rights bill bf 1957 was considered 
by this body, I opposed the bill, including the creation of the 
Civil Rights Commission. Although I spoke at some length concerning 
the defects of the proposal to create such a body, my objections 
fell largely on emotion-closed ears. I would like to recall to 
the Senate some of my comments on what was at that time a proposed 
Civil Rights Commission. On that occasion, I said: 
"Mr. President, I am opposed to the creation of a 
Commission on Civil Rights as proposed in Part I of 
( H. R. 6127. 
To begin with, there is absolutely no need or 
reason for the establishment of such a Commission. 
If there were any necessity for an investigation in 
the field of civil rights, such an investigation 
should be conducted by the States or by an appropriate 
Committee of the Congress, acting within the jurisdiction 
of congressional authority. It should not be done 
by a Commission. 
( I also object to Part I of H. R. 6127 because of 
the fact that it places duties upon the Commission and 
endows it with powers which no governmental commission 
should have. 
In fact, Mr. President, the language of the bill 
proposing to establish this Commission is so broad and 
so general that it may encompass more evils than have 
yet been detected in it. 
Under its duties and powers the Commission would 
be able to subpoena citizens to appear before it to 
answer questions on many subjects outside the scope 
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of elections and voting rights. 
Section 104 (a) provides The Commission shall--
"(l) investigate allegations in writing under 
oath or affirmation that certain citizens 
of the United States are being deprived 
of their right to vote and have that vote 
counted by reason of their color, race, 
religion, or national origin; which writing, 
under oath or affirmation, shall set forth 
the facts upon which such belief or beliefs 
are based;" 
Mr. President, the bill, in Part IV, contains an 
additional protection of the voting right of citizens above 
and beyond present State and Federal laws. Provision is 
made for enforcement of Part IV, and there were already 
sufficient enforcement provisions to carry out the intent 
of the existing State and Federal laws. I do not see 
how a Commission could enhance the investigative powers 
of law enforcement officers nor the enforcement and 
punitive authority of the courts. 
I can see no valid reason why a Commission should be 
created, in addition to the legal enforcement procedures, 
unless the purpose is for the Commission to stir up 
litigation among our people. 
This bill has been advertised, promoted, and bally­
hooed as a right to vote bill. However, I want to cite 
two paragraphs which give broad authority for investiga­
tions other than alleged violations of a person's right 
to vote. 
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Section 104 (a) provides The Commission shall--
"(2) study and collect information concerning legal 
developments constitu.ting a denial of equal 
protection of the laws under the Constitution; · 
and 
"(3) appraise the laws and policies of the Federal 
Government with respect to equal protection of 
the laws under the Constitution." 
Instead of limiting the power' of the Commiesion, these 
two paragraphs provide it with carte blanche authority 
to probe into and meddle into every phase of the rela­
tions existing between individuals which the Commi~sion 
and members of its staff could conjure up. 
I want to call particular attention to a divergence 
in language between paragraphs 2 and 3. Paragraph 2 
refers to a study of "legal developments constituting 
a denial of equal protection." Paragraph 3 says 
"appraise the laws and policies of the Federal Govern­
ment with respect to equal protection." 
The significant thing here is the omission of the 
specific intent of paragraph 2. Although the language 
of paragraph 2 is obscure and omits a governmental 
reference, it obviously must refer to State and local 
governments, else it would be redundant and have no 
meaning at all. 
Also, as I pointed out, investigations conducted 
under paragraphs 2 and 3 could go far afield from the 
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question of voting rights. The Commission could exert 
its efforts toward bringing about integration of the 
races in the schools, and elsewhere, under the authoriza­
tion of these two paragraphso Combining its authority to 
investigate on an unlimited scale and its authority to 
force witnesses to answer questions, the Commission would 
have a powerful weapon. 
Mr. President, I do not believe the people of this 
country realize the virtually unlimited powers of inquiry 
which would be placed in the hands of this political 
Commission. While the Commission would have no power 
to implement its desires, I do not believe the people of 
this country want such a totalitarian type of "persuasion" 
imposed upon them. 
Part I of H. R. 6127 purports to create a Civil Rights 
Commission. Actually, it would create a traveling investi­
gation Commission. 
Section 103 (b) of Part I also would place tremen­
dous power within the grasp of the Attorney General with 
reference to members of the Commission "otherwise in 
the service of the Government." The clear implication 
is that whoever drafted this scheme to send traveling 
agents over the country intended to make use of certain 
members of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. 
don 9 t believe it would be necessary to look farther 
than the Justice Department to determine where Commission 
members already in Government service would be secured. 
By placing his employees on the Commission, the Attorney 
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General would transform the traveling agents into an 
additional investigative arm of the Justice Department. 
Mr. President, I next call attention to the potential 
abuse found in Section 102 (g) under the innocuous 
title, 0 Rules of Procedure of the Commissiono" That 
section provides that: 
"No evidence or testimony taken in executive 
session may be released or used in public 
sessions without the consent of the Commis­
( 
sion. 'Whoe-ver relecl.ses or uses in public 
without the consent of the Commission evi­
dence or testimony taken in executive 
session shall be fined not more than $1,000, 
or ::i.mpr:i.soned for not more than one year." 
In an editorial of July 26, 1957, The Washington 
Post very correctly pointed out how this section 
could be used to imprison rsporters and other citizens 
for disclosure of what a witness might voluntarily tell 
them. This editorial provides a penetrating and en­
lightening criticism of this section. Because of its 
pertinency and fine analysis, I shall read the last 
three paragraphs of the editorial which is entitled 
"Open Rights Hearings," which states: 
"The bill contains an invitation to the com­
mission to operate behind closed doors. It 
provides that 9if the commission determines 
that evidence or testimony at any hearing 
may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate 
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any person, it shall ••• receive such evider-ce 
testimony in executive session••• , Some 
closed sessions may be necessary to avoid 
unfair reflections upon individuals, but 
these should certainly be an exception to 
the general rule, In our opinion, this 
section ought to be rewritten in a more 
positive vein to provide that sessions of 
the commission should be open to the public,( 
unless it should find that closed hearings 
were essential to avoid unfairness. 
"The House also wrote into the bill a dan­
gerous section providing for the fining or 
imprisonment for not more than one year of 
anyone who might 9release or use in public,' 
without the consent of the commission, any 
testimony taken behind closed doors. If 
the commission should choose to operate( 
under cover, without any valid reason to 
do so, newspaper reporters and other citizens 
could be jailed for d~sclosure of what a 
witness might voluntarily tell them. This 
is a penalty that has been shunned even in 
matters affecting national security. Such 
a provision is an invitation to abuse and 
a serious menace to the right of the people 
to know about the activities of governmental 
agencies, 
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0 It:. is well to remember that this would 
not be merely a study cummission. In 
addition it would be under 0bligation to 
investigate allegations that persons were 
being deprived of their rights under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendmentso It 
could subpoena witnesses and documents and 
appeal to the courts for enforcement of 
such edicts. Its powers would be such that 
it should be held to scrupulous rules of 
fairness. To encourage the commission to 
operate in secret, and then to penalize 
news media and citizens for disclo~ing 
what should have been public in the first 
place, ¥culd be the sort of mistake that 
Congress ought to avoid at the outset." 
Mre President, I think the points made in the editorial 
are clear and valid. Secrecy in the activities of such 
( a Commission could only lead to a denial of the rights 
of an individual rather than to protection of his rights. 
Another subject which must not be passed over is 
the subpoena power of the Commission. Section 105 (f) 
provides that "subpoenas for the attendance and testimony 
of ~itnesses or the production of written or other matter 
may be issued in accordance with the rules of the commis-
sion••• " 
Mr. President, many of the committees and special 
committees of the Congress do not have this power. The 
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Truman Commission on Civil Rights did not have it. 
The subpoena is a punitive measure, generally reserved 
for penal process whereby powers are granted to force 
testimony which would not otherwise be available. If 
the proposed commission were simply a fact-finding 
commission and non-political, the extreme power to 
force testimony by the use of a subpoena would not 
be needed. 
Neither would the power contained in Section 105 (g) 
which provides that Federal courts shall have the power, 
upon application by the Attorney General, to issue "an 
order requiring" a witness to answer a subpoena of the 
commission and "any failure to obey such order of the 
court may be punished by said court as a contempt 
thereof." 
The power of subpoena in the hands of a political 
commission and the additional power to enforce its 
subpoenas by court order diverge from the authority of 
the traditional American fact-finding commission. 
I look with suspicion upon such a commission so 
endowed with authority, and I object to its establishment. 
Mr. President, I want to discuss another reason, 
briefly, why I would be opposed to the establishment of 
the commission proposed in Part I of H. R. 6127. Every 
appropriation bill which has come before the Senate this 
year has been reduced by the Senate below the budget 
request. The people of this country have called upon 
the members of Congress to reduce the costs of government, 
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not to increase them by creating new agencies or 
commissions. 
The advocates of the commission might argue that 
the cost of its operation would not be great, but no­
where in the records of the hearings have I found an 
estimate of what the total cost would be. If the 
commission were to exist only for the two years pro-
vided in the bill , the compensation and per diem allowan~e 
of commission members would amount to more than a 
quarter of a million dollars, not counting their travel 
allowances. 
Since there is no limitation on the number of 
personnel which might ba appointed by the Commission, 
there is no way to estimate the ultimate cost of personnel 
salaries and expens~s. Since the commission is designed 
to travel over the country at will, very heavy travel 
expenses undoubtedly would be incurred. 
The taxpayers would never know how many of their 
tax dollars ware wasted by virtue of the seemingly 
innocuous language in Section 105 (e). Unknown, 
concealed costs are not, however, the only dangers 
lurking in that subsection. A serious departure from 
sound legislative procedure is also involved. 
In the past, when creating an agency or commission, 
Congress retained control of its creation by the appro­
priation power. This is a wonderful check, Mr. President, 
against the abuse or misuse of commission authority. 
Scrupulous care should be taken to preserve it. 
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However, Section 105 (e) provides that: 
"All Federal agencies shall cooperate fully 
with the commission to the end that it may 
effectively carry out its functions and duties." 
Thus the Civil Rights Commission could call on the 
other governmental agencies to perform many of its tasks. 
Congressional control over the commission would be much 
less than if the commission had to depend on its own 
appropriations and would not be permitted to use the 
resources of other agencies. Once the commission is 
created, only another law can check its activity during 
the period of its existence. 
Another thing that concerns me about this commission 
is the fact that once a government agency or commission 
is established, nothing else on earth so nearly approaches 
eternal existence as that government agency or commission. 
Mr. President, I fear that the two-year limitation placed 
upon the commission in this bill would simply be a 
starting point, and the people of this country should 
realize that at this time. 
With further reference to Section 104 (a), I want 
to point out the use of the mandatory word "shall." 
This word requires the commission to investigate all 
sworn allegations submitted to the commission of any 
citizen allegedly being deprived of his right to vote. 
But the provision neglects to require that such 
allegations be submitted by parties in interest--not 
simply by some meddler who seeks to create trouble 
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between other persons. This is another provision of 
this bill similar to Section 131 (c) which would permit 
the Attorney General to make the United States a party 
to a case without the consent of the party actually 
involved. 
Another objection to 104 (a) is that under this 
provision a person could make an allegation to the 
commission, against a person who was not even a citizen 
of the same State. Even so, under the mandatory language 
of Section 104 (a), the commission would be required to 
make an investigation of the charges. 
Since the commission is limited by Section 102 (k) 
to subpoenaing witnesses to hearings only within the 
State of residence of the witness, there would be no 
opportunity in such a situation for the accused to con­
front his accuser. Charges against a person should not 
be accepted by the commission unless the accuser is a 
citizen of the same State as the person he is charging 
with a violation of the law. 
Also, Mr. President, once the commission has received 
the sworn allegation, there is no requirement that other 
testimony received relating to the allegation be taken 
under oath. Failure to make all persons giving testimony 
subject to perjury prosecutions in the event they testify 
to falsehoods would surely destroy the value of any such 
testimony received. 
The commission could and might adopt a rule to require 
sworn testimony; but I should not like to see the Senate 
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leave that point to the discretion of the commission 
because, in my judgment, the Congress should require 
that practice to be followed0 
Mr. President, as I stated earlier, it ·is my view 
that an inquiry into the field of civil rights, or so­
called civil rights, is entirely unnecessary at this 
time. The laws of the States and the federal laws are 
being enforced effectively. 
Should there come a time when information might be( 
needed on this subject, the Congress should not delegate 
its authority to a commission. In such a delicate and 
sensitive area, the Congress should proceed with delibera­
tion and care. The appropriate committees of the Congress 
itself should hold hearings limited to the jurisdiction 
of the Congress, and the Congress should make its own 
determination as to the need for legislation. 
There is no present indication that any such study 
will be needed." 
Following these r~marks, Mr. President, I discussed the consti­
tutional objections to such a commission. Prior to the creation of 
the commission, I was bothered by grave questions as to the con­
stitutionality of such an investigatory group. Passage of time 
since its creation has strengthened and reinforced my position 
against the constitutionality of the commission. 
I did not and do not perceive from the debate on the so-called 
Civil Rights Act of 1957 that there was any intention by Senators 
to subject the commission to provisions of the Administrative Proce­
dure Act. Had they dared, I strongly suspect that the proponents 
of that Act would have specifically negated the applicability of 
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the Administrative Procedure Act. The proponents of the 1957 Act 
·lfanted all they could get in the way of authority for their vicious 
unit of disharmony. They dreamed of a true 0 star chamber", cloaked 
with arbitrary persecution powers. In their obsession with agitating 
the race issue, they evidenced no concern whatsoever with true civil 
rights, or as I prefer to call them, individual liberties. Their 
extreme fanatacism on the issue of RACE was paramount and exclusive-­
without objectivity, without balance, and without respect for tha 
rrsupreme Law of the Land."( 
My conclusions are not products of speculation or conjecture, 
Mr. President. Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 deals 
rather exhaustively, for an act of this type, with the rules and 
rule-making authority of the Civil Rights Commission. A perusal 
of this section reveals that it is designed almost exclusively as 
a grant of power to the commission, rather than a limitation for the 
protection of the rights of individuals. The text of this section 
is as follows: 
(a) The Chairman or one designated by him to 
act as Chairman at a hearing of the Commission shall 
announce in an opening statement the subject of the hearing. 
(b) A copy of the Commission 9 s rules shall be made 
available to the witness before the Commission. 
(c) Witnesses at the hearings may be accompanied by their 
own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning 
their constitutional rights. 
(d) The Chairman or Acting Chairman may punish breaches 
of order and decorum and unprofessional ethics on the part 
of counsel, by censure and exclusion from the hearings. 
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(e) If the Commission determines that evidence or 
testimony at any hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or 
incriminate any person, it shall (1) receive such evidence 
or testimony in executive session; ('2) afford such person 
an opportunity voluntarily to appear as a witness; and {3) 
receive and dispose of requests from such person to subpoena 
additional witnesses. 
(f) Exce~t as provided in sections 102 and 105 (f) of 
this Act, the Chairman shall receive and the Commission 
shall dispose of requests to subpoena additional witnesses, 
{g) No evidence or testimony taken in executive session 
may be released or used in pu~lic sessions without the con­
sent of the Commission. Whoever releases or uses in public 
witho~t ·. the consent of ~he C~mmission evidence or testi­
mony taken in executive session shall be fined not more than 
$1,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year. 
{h) In the discretion of the Commission, witnesses may 
submit brief and pertinent sworn statements in writing for 
inclusion in the record. The Commission is the sole judge 
of the pertinency of testimony and evidence adduced at its 
hearings. 
{i) Upon payment of the cost thereof, a witness may obtain 
a transcript copy of his testimony given at a public session, 
or, if given at an executive session, when authorized by 
the Commission. 
{j) A witness attending any session of the Commission 
shall receive $4 for each day 9 s attendance and for the time 
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necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the same, 
and 8 cents per mile for going from and returning to his 
place of residence. Witnesses who attend at points so far 
removed from their respective residences as to prohibit 
return thereto from day to day shall be en.titled to an addi­
tional allowance of $12 per day for expenses of subsistence, 
including the time necessarily occupied in going to and 
returning from the place of attendance. Mileage payments 
shall be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpoena 
issued on behalf of the Commission or any subcommittee 
thereof. 
(k} The Commission shall not issue any subpoena for the 
attendance and testimony of witnesses or for the production 
of written or other matter which would require the presence 
of the party subpoenaed at a hearing to be held outside of 
) the State, wherein the witness is found or resides or trans­
~ usiness." 
Mr. President, I invite the particular attention of the Senate 
to sub-paragraph ( c) of Section 102~ "Witnesses at the hearings J!!il 
be accompanied by their own counsel for the purpose Qf $rlvising them 
concerning their constitutional .r_ight,s." 
Mr. President, seldom has a subsection been drafted by any Con­
gress which has been so pregnant with basic deprivations and exclusions 
of the historical standards of fair play which permeates our juris­
prudence, and which we loosely refer to as due-process. Let us examine 
some of those procedural safeguards which are denied by this section. 
First, the right of a person appearing before the commission to be 
represented by counsel is negated. Substituted for representation by 
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counsel is the right--if it can be so broadly denominated--to be 
accompanied by counsel. Moral support is no substitute for an active 
defense. Such a provision can best be compared to n:iJ <>wing..an aea'JAS,ed 
person to have a few sympathizers in the audience when he is sentenced. 
But there is morel The ridiculous is made fantasticl The right 
to be accompanied by counsel is itself--weak as it is--limited to one 
exclusive purpose--that of advising the witness on his constitutional 
rights. Not on his legal rights, Mr. President, but only on his 
constitutional rights. I wonder, Mr. President, if the drafters of 
this language contemplated a monitoring of the advice of the accompany­
ing counsel to assure that counsel would not go astray and speak to 
the witness concerning some statutory right which might accrue ta the 
benefit of the witness. 
Does this subsection indicate a concern with individual liberty, 
or does it rather have the appearance of a deceitful gloss that gives 
an impression of preserving due process while actually emasculating it? 
The proponents of this legislation also wanted to insure that the 
4ccompanying ru2.,_ll!l§_el could be prevented from conducting themselves as( 
conscientious attorneys, Mr. President--thus, was included subsection 
(d) which reads: "The Chairman or Acting Chairman may p1mish breaches 
of order and decorum and unprofessional ethics on the part of counsel, 
by censure and exclusion from the hearings." Judgi~g from the over­
all import of Section 102, the "JID" which prefixes "professional" 
in subsection (d) must have been included by oversight. Consistency 
belies its inclusion. 
Subsection (g) established the "star chamber" session of the 
commission. This subsection so completely ignores constitutional 
safeguards contained in the Constitution and imposed by the people 
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for the protection of individual liberties, that one would logically 
conclude that its proponents had formerly existed in a vacuum, rather 
than in a democratic soc~ety. It is completely incompatible with 
freedom of speech and the press. It precludes the right of confronta­
tion of accuser by the accused, as well as the right of cross-examina.­
tion. Its purport is reinforced by subsection (i), which specifies 
that a witness may purchase a copy of his .2.!'fil testimony, but omits 
any authorization for a witness to even .§ll the testimony of ari 
1.ccuser. 
Mr. President, I would be the first to admit,--nay, assert--
that the requirements of "due process" vary considerably, depending 
on the proceedings to which they are applied. The requirements are 
most strict when applied to a criminal prosecution. In some proceedingt 
where no basic right -of the individual is involved, little, if any, 
application of due process safeguards are demanded by the Constitution 
nor required by good conscience. 
It should be clear, however, that a criminal prosGcution includes 
~ore than the formal trial itselfo Indeed, historically, much of the 
concern which the courts have evidenced over the application of due 
process in criminal prosecutions has been in the pre-trial area of 
apprehension, and preparation of the prosecution case against the 
accused. This is the precise area into which the investigations of 
the Civil Rights Commission were intended to, and in fact, did, fall. 
By the terms of the Act itself, investigations by the commission 
must be predicated on a complaint that either a statute or the Con­
stitution has been violated. The commission was given, and has exer­
cised, the power to subpoena those accused. Part II and Part III 
strengthened the machinery for prosecution of violations established 
by the commission. 
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There can be but one logical conclusion. The Civil Rights 
Commission is unconstitutionalc 
If there be any doubts--and I can conceive no basis for doubt-­
of the unconstitutionality of this comission, stemming specifically 
from the rule-making power granted in Section 102, consider the rul0s 
of the commission. They are as follows.
----"l. Under Public Law 85-315, Section 105(f), the Commis-
sion on Civil Rights may hold hearings and issue subpoenas 0r 
authorize a subcommittee to hold hearings and issue subpoenas 
under the following conditi'ons: 
The Commission or on the authorization of the Commission 
any subcommittee of two or more members, at least one of whom 
shall be of each major poli'tical party, may, for the purpose 
of carrying out the p~ovisions of this Act, hold such hearings 
and act at such times and places as the Commission or such 
authorized subcommittee may deem adviseable. Subpoenas for the 
attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of 
written or other matter may be issued in accordance with the 
rules of the Commission as contained in section 102(j) and 
(k) of this Act, over the signature of the Chairman of the 
Commission or of such subcommittee~ and may be served by any 
person designated by such Chairman. 
2. All such hearings of the Commission will be governed by 
the following statut~ry Rules of Procedure provided in Section 102 
of Public Law $5-315: 
(a) The Chairman or one designated by him to act as 
Chairman at a hearing of the Commission shall announce in an 
opening statement the subject of the hearing. 
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(b) A copy of the Commisaion?s rules shall be made 
available to the witness before the Comm~ssiono 
(c) Witnesses at the hea~ings may be accompanied by 
their own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning 
their constitutiona: rights. 
(d) The Chairman or Acting Chairman may punj.sh breaches 
of order and decorum and unprofessional ethics on the part 
of counsel, by censure and exclusion from the hearings. 
(e) If the Commission determines that evidence or 
testimony at any hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or 
incriminate any person, it shall (1) receive such evidence 
or testimony in executive session~ (2) afford such person 
an opporttrriity voluntarily to appear as a witness; and (3) 
receive and dispose of requests from such person to subpoena 
additional witnesses. 
(f) Except as provided in sections 102 and 105(f) of 
this Act, the Chairman shall receive and the Commission 
shall dispose of requests to subpoena additional witnesseso 
(g) No evidence or testimony taken in executive session 
may be re:.eased or used in public sessions without the consent 
of the Commission. Whoever releases or uses in public with­
out the consent of the Commission evidence or testimony taken 
in executive session shall be fined not more than $1,000, or 
imprisoned for not more than one year. 
(h) In the discretion of the Commission, witnesses may 
submit brief and pertinent sworn statements in writing for 
inclusion in the record. The Commission is the sole judge 
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of the pertinency of testimony and evidence adduced at its 
hearings. 
(i) Upon payment of the cost thereof, a witness may 
obtain a transcript copy of his testimony given at a public 
session or, if given at an executive session, when authorized 
by the Commission. 
(j) A witness attending any session of the Commission 
shall receive $4 for each day 9 s attendance and for the time 
necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the same, 
and 8 cents per mile for going from and returning to his 
place of residence. Witnesses who attend at points so far 
removed from their respective residences as to prohibit 
return thereto from day to day shall be entitled to an additional 
allowance of $12 per day for expenses of subsistence, including 
the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from 
the place of attendance. Mileage payments shall be tendered 
to the witness upon service of a subpoena issued on behalf 
of the Commission or any subcommittee thereof.( 
(k) The Commission shall not issue any subpoena for the 
attendance and testimony of witnesses or for the production 
of written or other matter which would require the presence 
of the party subpoenaed at a hearing to be held outside of 
the State, wherein the witness is found or resides or trans­
acts business. 
3. In addition to these statutory provisions, the Commission 
has adopted the following supplementary Rules of Procedure: 
(a) All the provisions of Section 102 of Public Law 
85-315, incorporated in Rule 2 above, shall be applicable 
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to and govern the proceedings of all subcommittees appoint ad 
by the Commission pursuant to Section 105(f) of Public Law 85-
315, incorporated in Rule 1 abov-e~ 
(b) At least two members of the Comm~ssion must be present 
at any hearing of the Commission or of any sub-committee 
thereof. 
(c) The holding of hearings by the Commission or the 
appointment of a subcommittee to hold hearings pursuant to 
the provisions in Rule 1 above must be approved by a majcr-
( ity of the members of the Commission or by a majority of the 
members present at a meeting at which at least a quorum of 
four members is present .. 
(d) Subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses 
or the production of written or other matter may be issued ov~r 
the signature of the Chairman of the Commission by the Chairman 
or by the Chairman upon the request of a member of the Commission 
(e) Subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesse& 
or the production of written or other matter may be issued over 
the signature of the Chairman of a subcommittee appointed pur­
suant to the provisions of Rule 1 above by the Chairman or by 
the Chairman upon the request of a member of the subcommittee. 
(f) An accurate transcript shall be made of the testi-
mony of all witnesses in all hearings, either public or execu­
tive sessions, of the Commission or of any subcommittee thereof. 
Each witness shall have the right to inspect the record of his 
own testimony. A transcript copy of his testimony may be 
purchased by a witness pursuant to Rule 2(i) above. Transcript 
copies of public sessions may be obtained by the public upon 
payment of the cost thereof. 
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{g) Any witness desiring to read a prepared statement 
in a hearing shall file a copy with the Commission or sub­
committee 24 hours in advance. The Commission or subcommittee 
shall decide whether to permit the reading of such statement, 
(h) The Commission or subcommittee shall decide whether 
written statements or documents submitted to it shall be 
placed in the record of the hearing. 
(i) Interrogation of witnesses at hearings shall be 
conducted only by members of the Commission or by authorized 
staff personnel. 
(j) If the Commission pursuant to Rule 2(e), or any 
subcommittee thereof, determines that evidence or testimony 
at any hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate 
any person, it shall advise such person that such evidence 
has been given and it shall afford such person an opportunity 
to read the pertinent testimony and to appear as a voluntary 
witness or to file a sworn statement in his behalf. 
(k) Subject to the physical limitations of the hearing 
room and consideration of the physical comfort of Commission 
members, staff, and witnesses, equal and reasonable access 
for coverage of the hearings shall be provided to the various 
means of communications, including newspapers, magazines, 
radio, news reels, and television. However, no witness shall 
be televised, filmed or photographed during the hearing if he 
objects on the ground of distraction, harassment, or physical 
handicap. 
4. Public Law $5-315, Section 105(g) provides that in case ef 
contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena of either the Commission 
or a subcommittee thereof, any district court of the United States 
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or the United States court of any Territory or possession, or 
the District Court of the United States for the District of 
Columbia, within the jurisdiction o·f which said person guilty 
of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts 
business, upon application by the Attorney General of the United 
States shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order 
requiring such person to appear before the Commission or a 
subcommittee thereof, there to produce evidence if so ordered, 
or there to give testimony touching the matter under investiga-( 
l ~~on; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be 
L unished by said court as a contempt thereof. n 
Mr. President, these are tr.e ~ules as approved and adopted by 
the commission July 1, 1958. They are beyond question responsive to 
the terms of the Act which c:eated the commission. They emphasize 
by implementation and expansion the unconstitutionality of the act 
creating the commission. 
I am not alone in my assertions as to the constit~tional implica­
tions of this Statute, Mr. Presidente For instance, the State of 
Arkansas, through its Attorney General, filed a brief with the 
Federal District Court in Louisiana, which said in part: 
Civil Rights Commission is extraordinary, if not unique, 
function much the same as a congressional 
investigating committee and if its apparent interpretation of 
the law creating it (Civil Rights Act, Public Law, 85-315, 
Title 42, USCA § 1975 et seq.) is sustained it possesses all 
the power and authority of a "Star-Chamber" undertaking. It 
is the assumption by the Commission or the delegation by the 
Congress of this power and authority which gives rise to the 
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in that it intends to 
serious question of the Committee's legal existance. If the 
Civil Rights Commission is not subject to the provisions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (5 USCA, §§ 1001 et seq.), 
then that portion of the Civil Rights Act creating the 
Commission is invalid as a violation of Article I and Amend­
ments 5, 6 and 9 of the Constitution of the United States. 
I. 
THAT PORTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT CREATING THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
COMMISSION IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY 
THE CONGRESS AND IT DEPRIVES WITNESSES BEFORE IT OF THEIR RIGHTS 
AS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The right of Congress to investigate through its own agency 
is unquestioned. This right is derived from its determination 
or duty to legislate upon particular subject matter. It may be 
well to point out here that in the field assigned to the Civil 
Rights Commission there was companion remedial legislation (42 
USCA § 1971) thoroughly covering the subject matter the Commission 
was supposed to investigate. One may obliquely inquire at this 
point es to what further legislation could be contemplated based 
on any investigation and finding made by the Civil Rights Com­
mission. It is true that in U.S •. v, Rains, 172 F. Supp. 557, 
Section 1971, paragraph (c) was held unconstitutional but the 
remedy, if any, for that deficiency will be found in consti­
tutional legislation, not further commission investigation. 
It is well to keep in mind that this Commission is greatly 
dissimilar to the great body of regulatory agencies which possess 
investigative powers. Those regulatory agencies investigate with 
a view to determining facts in relation to violations, compliance, 
etc., with the law they administer. The Civil Rights Commission 
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investigates for the sake of investigation. There is no frame­
work of law in which the Commission operates; in fact, there is 
no law to administer an no authority to regulate. As pointed 
out in complainants 9 trial brief, the Commission is not limited 
to the investigation of voting deprivations committed or caused 
by state officers or even where an individual acting tmder the 
guise of state authority deprives some person of his voting 
privilege, but extends to every possible situation irrespective 
of the authority of Congress to legislate with reference to that 
situation. This fact in itself is sufficient to render the Act 
unconstitutional. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; Kil­
bourn v. Thompson, 103 U.Sc 16S~ u.s~ v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 
597. 
If this Commission has been clothed with all the power and 
authority of Congress, and the law creating the Commission is 
very reminiscent of a House or Senate resolution creating a 
special investigating committee of its members, it must, of course, 
be bound by at least the same g=-ound rules and constitutional 
limitations. If it can be successfully argued that the Civj_l 
Rights Commission is not subject to the Administrative Procedure 
Act, then an inquiry must be made into what rules, regulations 
and laws do apply to the Commission 9 s proceedings. The only 
place one can find the answer is in the Act itself, and even a 
casual reading of the Act indicates that there is no answer. 
To examine these provisions in the light of what the Commission 
considers the limitations are, is to be startled if not shocked 
by the ignoring of the constitutional rights of individuals 
who may be called before it. The rules of the committee reflect 
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the validity of this statement. The authority to make these 
rules must be inferred from the provision of Section 1975a 
(there is no express grant of such authority). Section 1975a 
(c) does allow witnesses to be accompanied by counsel "for the 
purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights." 
It does not provide that a witness may assert his constitutional 
rights before the Commission. If this last appears to be an un­
worthy observation it is no less unworthy than the Commission's 
conclusion regarding a witness's right to be informed of the 
nature of the investigation or his right to cross-examine other 
witnesses. The Commission's power to investigate must be exercised 
with due respect for the rights of witnesses appearing before it. 
See Sinclaj_r v. U.tS., 279 U.,S. 2(,3. The Commission by its rules 
and attitude has indicated tha~ it considers itself and its 
activities above the requirements of the constitution and the 
restri~tion of fair play. The real difficulty here is that 
Congress has not provided any standard or means of accomplishing 
the Commission's somewhat hazy ~ission. Such a standard or means 
must necessarily be present in order to validate the Commission 9s 
existance. See U.S. v. c, Thomas Stores, 49 F. Suppo 111; U.S. v. 
Wright, 48 F. Supp. 687. The Civil Rights Commission, under the 
guise of declaring procedural rules and investigative policy, 
has legislated substantive laws out of existance. If the Com­
mission is correct in this assumption of such broad "rule making" 
power, then Congress has delegated legislative authority which 
even Congress itself may not possess. It is no answer to the 
problem posed here to say that the complainants or other wit­
nesses may assert their rights when denied by the Commission 
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through resor·t to the Court. To single shot every invalid 
"rule" which has or might be promulgated by the Commission 
would place an insurmountable burden on those subject to 
appearance before ito 
II. 
THE ·crvrL RIGHTS COMMISSION IS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT. 
The Civil Rights Commission is operating and acting with 
the expressed sanction of the Congress behind it and as such, 
is an agency of the government. Laster Vo Guy F. Atkinson Go., 
176 ,Fed. 2nd 984; Donahue v. George A. Fuller Co., 104 F. Supp. 
145. As an agency of the gove~nment, the Commission 9 s function 
is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, unless exceptedo 
The exceptions to the Administ~ative Procedure Act are few and 
simple and a consideration of the exceptions set forth in the 
Act show that the only possible way in which the Civil Rights 
Commission could be excepted is through a proper and express 
delegation of authority by law. There is nothing in the Civil 
Rights Act creating the Commision that even hints of an ex­
ception. 
9Exemptions from the terms of the Administrative 
Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed in 
view of the statement i .n § 12 of the Act that 
modifications must be express.' Marcello v. Bonds, 
349 u.s. 302. 
The protection afforded by the Administrative Procedure Act 
should be equally available to protect personal rights as well 
as·pr.operty rights. l. A. Tucker Truck Lines v. u.s.,100 F. Supp. 
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432. The intended course of the Commission under its rules and 
pronouncements as reflected in the complaint virtually strips 
the complainants of all the protection sought to be afforded by 
the Procedure Act. This is exactly the sort of conduct the 
Administrative Procedure Act was intended to prevent. 
"The Administrative Procedure Act was framed as a 
check upon administrators whose zeal might other­
wise carry them to excess not contemplated in the 
legislation creating their offices. It creates 
safeguards even narrower than the constitutional 
ones, against arbitrary official encroachment on 
private rights." u.s. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 
u. s. 632. 
It is not necessary to engage in extensive analysis of the 
terms of 42 USCA § 1975e The Civil Rights Commission is so 
obviously an agency of the government that argument to the con­
trary is facetious. It is equally obvious that there is no 
statement exempting the Comm:!.ssion from the provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act and any rules making authority the 
Commission may possess must be exercised only within the limita­
tions placed upon it by the Administrative Procedure Act.n 
Mr. President, the Attorney General of the sovereign State of 
Arkansas is referri~g. in this brief to the body which the Congress 
created in 1957, and into which it is proposed that we now breathe 
life for another two years. 
Mr. President, we have more than assertions of unconstitutionality 
to face in assessing this proposal to extend the life of the Civil 
Rights Commission. We have a finding of the Court--not a State Court--
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but a Federal Court, mind you. The finding of the court to which 
I refer is in the decision of the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Louisiana in the case of Margaret M. Larche. 
v. John A. Hannah, rendered July 12, 19590 The order of the court 
is as follows~ 
( 
( 
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RULING ON APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS 
"We are called upon here to pass tentatively upon 
one of the burning issues of our time -- the propriety 
and validity of the Rules and Proceedings of the Civil 
Rights Commission, as established by Congress in September, 
1957. 
"That Commission now proposes to hold a hearing, in 
the Federal Court room at Shreveport, Louisiana, on 
July 13, 1959, to investigate purported violations of 
the civil voting rights of some 67 persons, who are said 
to have filed sworn complaints with the Commission. 
Pursuant to, and in implementation of, its plans, the 
Commission has caused subpoenas, and subpoenas duces tecum, 
to be served upon the plaintiffs in these suits, commanding 
them to be present and give testimony at the hearing, and 
requiring the 16 Registrars of Voters, who are plaintiffs 
in Civil Action No. 7479, to bring with them, for inspection 
and copying by the Commission, a large number of records 
from their offices. 
"These suits, brought against the members of the 
Commission, and the Commission itself, were filed on July 
10, 1959, and are addressed to the equitable powers of 
this Court. They seek to stay the effectiveness of the 
Commission's subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, and to 
restrain and enjoin the c.onduct of the proposed hearing 
itself, which, plaintiffs aver, under the Rules of Procedure 
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adopted by the Commission, would violate their i\':.n.da­
~ental constitutional rights and cause them immediate 
and irreparable damage. Moreover, praying that a 
tnree-judge court be convened for that purpose, the 
Registrar-plaintiffs ask that the Act creating the 
Commission be declared violative of the Federal 
Constitution, and thus unenforceable. 
"Detailing their complaints, supported by sworn 
affidavits and exhibits attached, (and here briefly 
paraphrased), the Registrar-plaintiffs, in Civil 
Action No. 7479, allege that between June 29, 1959, 
and July 6, 1959, each of them were served with sub­
poenas and subpoenas duces tecum, issued by the 
Chairman of the Commission, commanding them to appear 
and testify before the Commisiion on July 13, 1959, 
and to bring their records with them: that they have 
not been informed of the nature of the complaint or 
complaints against them, nor have they been assured 
that they will be confronted with the complaining wit­
nesses~ that the Commission repeatedly has informed 
the Attorney General of Louisiana, verbally and in 
writing, that it would not, under any circunstances, 
furnish plaintiffs with, or permit them to examine the 
written complaints filed against them, nor would it 
divulge the name or names of the secret complainants, 
all of which is arbitrary and unreasonable, and in 
violation of plaintiffs 9 fundamental rights. 
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"They further aver that they, at all times, have 
complied with the laws of the State of Louisiana, 
but that the subpoenas served upon them would require 
them to violate such laws, in that the Registrars' 
records legally may not be removed from their offices, 
except 'upon an order of a competent court', criminal 
penalties being provided for violations of these statutes~ 
and that the Commission is not a 'competent court'. 
Hence, they say, to comply with the subpoenas, they 
would be violating the State laws, and subjecting 
themselves to the penalties thus provided. 
"These plaintiffs further allege that, attached 
to the subpoenas served upon them, was a mimeographed 
document entitled 'Rules of Procedure for hearings of 
the Commission on Civil Rights' in which appears the 
following: '(i) Interrogation of witnessess shall be 
conducted only by members of the Commission or by 
authorized staff personnel'; and that thereby 
plaintiffs are deprived of their constitutional right 
to cross-examine witnessess who may testify against 
them. They contend that the Commission and its 
members thus are acting in an ultra vires manner in 
1) attempting to force the plaintiffs to testify at 
the proposed hearing without first advising them of 
the nature of the complaint or complaints existing~ 
2) without allowing plaintiffs to be confronted by 
the complaining witnesses~ 3) not allowing plaintiffs 
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to have counsel empowered to fully represent their 
interests in such hearing; 4) not allowing cross­
examination of the complaining witnesses~ and 5) 
causing irreparable damage to plaintiffs by requiring 
them to violate the Laws of Louisiana, which would 
subject them to serious criminal penalties. In their 
brief, they also urge, as a direct incident of the 
hearing itselr, with unnamed and unknown witnesses 
testifying against them, not subject to cross-examination 
by plaintiff's counsel, that they will be wrongfully 
accused of violations of both Federal and State laws, 
without adequate opportunity to disprove such 
accusations, and thus be held up, by the Commission's 
actions, to public opprobrium and scorn, all to their 
irreparable injury and damage. 
"They further contend that the Commission, being 
an agency of the Executive branch of the Federal 
Government, is subject to the provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, and, as such, is 
required to state explicitly the charges against 
plaintiffs, to permit them to be confronted with 
the witnesses against them, and to allow their 
counsel fully to cross-examine such witnesses. 
Accordingly, these plaintiffs seek the relief 
hereinabove outlined. 
"In general, the plaintiffs in Civil Action 
No. 74$0, who are individual citizens of Louisiana, 
make the same allegations and contentions as those in 
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No~ 7479, except that they have not been called upon 
to ~~educe any official records. They do not challenge 
the constitutionality of the Act cr9ating the Commission, 
but otherwise their prayeT for relief is substantially 
3imilar to that in No. 7479, 
"Several days prior to July 10, 1959, we were 
advised by plaintiffs' counsel that they would file 
these suits on the date indicatedo While, as a general 
rule, applications for temporary restraining orders 
are considered fil£ parte, solely on the face of the 
verified complaint a~d any attached documents, because 
of the national importance of the matters involved, 
we immediately notified counsel for the Commission, 
and its Vice-Chairman, Honorable Robert G. Storey 
(a personal friend of the Court's, of long standing} 
of our information, and invited them to be present 
for a hearing on the applications. The suits were 
filed at 1:30 P. M. on July 10, and at 2:00 P. M., 
in open Court, these gentlemen, and counsel for 
plaintiffs, being present, we convened Court, but 
immediately recessed in order to give the Commission's 
representatives opportunity to study the complaints and 
briefs filed by plaintiffs. At J:30 P. M., we reconvened 
and heard oral arguments, from both sides, until 5:20 P. M., 
at which time the matter of the restraining orders 
was submitted for decision on the oral arguments and 
briefs filed by the proponents and opponents of the 
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applications. We have considered the able arguments, 
studied the respective briefs and authorities cited, and 
now proceed to our ruling. Necessarily, because of 
the time element, we have been compelled, under great 
pressure, to consider the questions rather hastily; 
and we reserve the right to alter our views, if necessary, 
after more mature deliberation. 
"The Court has jurisdiction. 28 u.s.c.A. ~~ 1331, 
1332, 2201, 2282, 2284. Jones Y.!.. Securities Commission, 
298 U.S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 654, 80 L. Ed. 1015. 
"We are not strongly impressed with the Registrar- ·· 
plaintiffs' contention that the subpoenas duces tecum, 
if complied with, would subject them to criminal 
penalties under Louisiana law. Literally, of course, 
if they directly complied without more, they are correct 
in their understanding of the State law. Pratically, 
however, another and different aspect is presented, for 
under the Civil Rights Commission Act they can refuse to 
produce the records, without penalties of any kind, 
and the only recourse the Commiss~on would have would 
be to request the Attorney General of the United States 
to apply to this Court, under 42 u.s.c.A. 1975d(g) 
for an order requiring their production. Plaintiffs 
then would be protected against State prosecution by 
the very terms of LSA-R.S. 18:236, as well as by 
LSA-R.S. 18:169 for this Court clearly is a 'competent 
court', within the meaning of those Statutes. 
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"Likewise, plaintiffs would suffer no immediate 
federal penalties under the Act for refusal either to 
appear or to testify, but would be subject to an 
enforcement order from this Court, which would see to 
it that their constitutional rights against self­
incrimination are adequately protected. Moreover, under 
the Act, since their counsel are entitled to be present, 
they could be advised, at each step of the proceedings, 
whether to claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment, 
even though, in this day, the general public has come 
to consider such a claim as tantamount to a plea of 
guilty, particularly in response to 'loaded' questions. 
"We are strongly of the opinion, however, that 
plaintiffs' remaining grounds for immediate relief 
are well taken: 
"First, it appears rather clear, at this juncture, 
that the Civil Rights Commission is an 'agency' of the 
Executive branch of the United States, within the 
meaning of that term as defined at 5 u.s.C.A. ~ 1001 (a) . 
See also 42 u.s.c.A. ~ 1975 (a). It performs quasi­
judicial functions in its hearings, its fact findings, 
its studies of 'legal developments constituting a denial 
of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution', 
and its appraisal of 'the laws and policies of the 
Federal Government' in the same respect. It 'adjudicates' 
by its rulings upon the admissibility of evidence at 
its hearings and by its determinations of what is or 
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is not the truth in matters before it, Thus we think 
that the Commission is subject to the provisions of 
section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which 
requires, among other things that persons affected by 
agency action '· •• shall be timely informed of the 
matters of fact and law asserted.' Here that would 
encompass the nature of the charges filed against 
plaintiffs, as well as the matters of fact and law 
wherein the complainants' voting rights allegedly have 
been violated. The Commission also is subject to section 
6 which would require it to grant plaintiffs the right 
9to conduct such cross-examination as may be required 
for a full and true disclosure of the facts. This, 
by its Rules, the Commission refuses to do, and in 
so doing, regardless of its well intentioned motives, 
it violates the terms of that Act. Plaintiffs are 
entitled, therefore, to protection against these Rules, 
which would deprive them of their plain rights under 
the Act. 
"Second, while the statute creating the Commission 
inferentially permits it to adopt reasonable Rules, 
42 u.s.c.A. ~ 1975 (b), there is no provision whatsoever 
in the law to the effect that such Rules may include 
those here complained of, which plainly violate plaintiffs' 
basic rights to know in advance with what they are charged, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against them, and to 
cross-examine their accusers. We cannot believe that 
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Congress intended to deny these fundamental rights to 
anyone, and because of such belief it is our opinion 
that these Rules of the Commission are ultra vires 
and unenforceable. Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled 
to immediate relief against them. 
"Third,entirely aside from the statutory questions 
just discussed, the Courts of the United States, and 
'0heir Anglo-Saxon predecessors, always have seen to it 
that, in hearings or trials of all kinds, persons 
accused of violating laws must be adequately advised 
,..~ ~~- ... 1-....u--aou ae,c..ludC them. confronted by their accusers, 
and permitted to search for the truth through thorough 
cross-examination. In i~s .'Y.!.. Securities Commission, 
298 • S. 1, 27, 57 S. Ct. 654, 80 L. Ed. 1015, the 
Supreme Court said: 
"• •• 'A general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial, 
compulsory investigation, conducted by a commission 
without any allegations, upon no fixed principles, 
and governed by no rules of law, or of evidence, 
and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice, 
is unknown to our constitution and laws ; and such 
an inquisition would be destructive of the rights 
of the citizen, and an intolerable tyranny. Let 
the power once be established, and there is no 
knowing, where the practice under it would end.' 
"The fear that some malefactor may go 
unwhipped of justice weighs as nothing against 
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this just and strong condemnation of a practice so 
odious ••• 
"The philosopny that constitutional limitations 
and legal restraints upon official action may be 
brushed aside upon the plea that good, perchance, 
may follow, finds no countenance in the American 
system of government. An investigation~ based 
upon specified grounds is quites& ob,jectionable 
ll a search warrant~ based upon specific 
statements Qf fact. ~ .a!1 investigation, .Q!: 
§..!!£ha search, is unlawful !!lits inception and 
cannot be made lawful !2Y what it may bring, or by 
what it actually succeeds in bringing to light • • •" 
In Morgan, et al v. United States, et al, 304 U.S. 
1, 14, 20, 25, 5g s. Ct. 773, $2 D. Ed 1129, involving 
an administrative hearing the Court said: 
"The first question goes to the very foundation 
of the action of administrative agencies entrusted 
by the Congress with broad control over activities 
which in their detail cannot be dealt with directly 
by the legislature. The vast expansion of this 
field of administrative regulation in response to 
the pressure of social needs is made possible 
under our system by adherence to the basic principles 
that the legislature shall appropriately determine 
the standards of administrative action and that in 
administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial 
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character the liberty and property of the citizen shall 
be protected by the rudimentary requirements of 
Ifair play. These demand a fair and open hearing,• 
-- essential alike to the legal validity of the 
administrative regulation and to the maintenance 
of public confidence in the value and soundness 
of this important governmental process. Such a 
hearing has been described as an 'inexorable 
safeguard. 11 
"The answer that the proceeding before the 
Secretary was not of an adversary character, as it 
was not upon complaint but was initiated as a general 
inquiry, is futile. It has regard to the mere form 
of the proceeding and ignores realities • 
11 
'Those who are brought into contest with the 
Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at 
the control of their activities are entitled to be 
fairly advised of what the Government proposes and 
to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its 
final command • • • , 11 
"In the most recent decision on this subject, 
handed down by the Supreme Court on June 29, 1959, 
Greene~ McElroy, No. 180, October 1958 Term ____ 
U. S. ___, __ S. Ct. _,__ L. Ed. ____, 
29 L. W. 4528, 4534, 4538, and speaking through Chief 
Justice Warren, the following language is found: 
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11 Certain principles have remained relatively 
immutable in our jurisprudence. Once of these is 
that where governmental action seriously injures 
an individual, and the reasonableness or the action 
depends on fact findings, the evidence used to 
prove the Government's case must be disclosed to 
the individual so that he has an opportunity to 
show that it is untrue. While this is important in 
the case of documentary evidence, it is even more 
important where the evidence consists of the 
testimony of individuals whose memory might be 
faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or 
persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, 
intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have 
formalized these protections in the requirements 
of confrontation and cross-examination. They have 
ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth 
Amendment which provides that in all criminal cases 
the accused shall enjoy the right •to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.' This Court 
has been zealous to protect these rights from 
erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal 
cases, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 u. s. 
237, 242-244; Kirby!.!_ United States, 174 u. s. 47; 
Motes .Y.!. United States, 178 u. s. 458, 474; 
In~ Oliver, 333 u. s. 257, 273, but also in all types 
of cases where administrative and regulatory action 
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were under scrutiny. E • .6..:,_, Southern .!h_ Co. Y..:.. 
Virginia, 290 u. s. 190; .Q!l!.£ Eell Telephone Co. 
Y..:,_ Commission, 301 U. s. 292; Morgan Y..:.. United 
States, 304 U.S. 1, 19; Carte£_ Y..:.. Kubler, 320 
u. s. 243; Reilly Y..:.. Pinkue, 338 u. s. 269. 
Nor, as it has been pointed out, has Congress 
ignored these fundamental requirements in enacting 
regulatory legislation. Joint Anti-fascist Committee 
Y..:.. McGrath, 341 u. s. 168-169 (concurring opinion). 
"Professor Wigmore, commenting on the importance 
of cross examination, states in his treatise, 5 Wigmore on 
Evidence ( 3d · Ed. 1949) ~ 1367: 
"For two centuries past, the policy of the 
Anglo-American system of Evidence has been to 
regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination 
as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no 
safeguard for testing the value of human statements 
is comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, 
and the conviction that no statement (unless by 
special exception) should be used as testimony until 
it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has 
found increasing strength in lengthening experience. 11 
11Where administrative action has raised serious 
constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that 
Congress or the President intended to afford those 
affected by the action the traditional safeguards of 
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due process. See, e. lfu_, The Japanese Immigrant Case, 
189 u. s. 86, 101; Dismuke Y.!.. United States, 
297 u. s. 167, 172; Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 
229-300; American Power Co. Y.!.. Securities~ 
Exchange Commission, 329 u. s. 90, 107-108; 
Hannegan Y.!.. Esquire, 327 u. s. 146, 156; Wong~ 
Sung~ McGrath, 339 u. s. 33, 49. Cf. Anniston 
Mfg. Co.~ Davis, 301 u. s. 337; United States~ 
Rumely, 345 u. s. 41. These cases reflect the 
Court's concern that traditional forms of fair 
procedure not be restricted by implication and 
without the most explicit action by the Nation's 
lawmakers, even in areas where it is possible that 
the Constitution presents no inhibition." 
"These authorities, therefore, clearly establish 
additional reasons why plaintiffs should be granted 
immediate relief. 
"Fourth, there is every reason to believe 1 considering 
that the Commission has announced its receipt of complaints 
from some 67 persons, that those persons will testify that 
plaintiffs have violated either the State or Federal laws, 
or both. Plaintiffs thus will be condemned out of the 
mouths of these witnesses, and plaintiffs' testimony alone, 
without having the right to cross-examine and thereby to 
test the truth of such assertions, may not be adequate 
to meet or overcome the charges, thus permitting plaintiffs 
d 
to be stigmatized and hel/ up, before the eyes of the nation 
to opprobrium and scorn. Moreover, not knowing in advance the 
exact nature of the charges to be made against them, some of 
the plaintiffs, whose officialdom ciles are at varying 
distances up to 250 miles from Shreveport, may not be able 
physically to obtain the presence of witnesses of their own, 
who might negative or disprove the claims of the complaining 
witnesses, especially since the Commission has announced -chat 
its hearing will last only one day. 
"These are further solid reasons, showing possible 
or probably irreparable injury to plaintiffs, which justify 
their being granted immediate relief. 
"Fifth, and finally, plaintiffs raise very serious 
questions regarding the validity -- the constitutionality 
of the very Act which created the Commission. We do not 
intimate here any opinion as to the constitutionality of 
the Statute, for that is a matter to be decided by the three­
judge court to be con7ened by the Chief Judge of this Circuit. 
However, the seriousness of the attack must be noted in 
considering whether a temporary restraining order should be 
issued, to stay the effectiveness of the Statute until its 
validity vel non can be determined by the three-judge court
-- . 
after hearing on plaintiffs' application for an interlocutory 
injunction. See Ohio 011 .£2..:_ ~ Conway, 279 u. s. 813, 
49 s. Ct. 256, 73 L. Ed. 972, where the Supreme Court stated, 
in a per curiam opinion: 
"The application for an interlocutory injunction 
was submitted on ex parte affidavits which are harmonious 
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in some particulars and contradictory in other. 
The affidavits, especially those for the defendant, 
are open to the criticism that on some points mere 
conclusions are given instead of primary facts. Blt 
enough appears to make it plain that there is a real 
dispute over material questions of fact which can not 
be satisfactorily resolved upon the present affidavits 
and yet must be resolved before the constitutional 
validity of the amendatory statute can be determined.( 
"Where the questions presented by an application 
for an interlocutory injunction are grave, and the 
injury to the moving party will be certain and 
irreparable if the application be denied and the final 
decree be in hie favor, while if the injunction be 
granted the injury to opposing party, even if the 
final decree be in his favor, will be inconsiderable, 
or may be adequately indemnified by a bond, the injunction 
usually will be granted. Love Y..:,_ Atchison, Topeka 
& Sante Fe & Co • , 185 Fed. 321, 331-332 . " 
"In Crockett Y..:,_ Hortman, 101 F. Supp.111, 115, at page 
115, Judge Wright, of the Eastern District of Louisiana, 
dealing with the constitutionality of a State statute, said: 
"Where as here the questions presented by an 
application for a temporary injunction are grave, and the 
injury to the moving parties will be certain and 
irreparable if the application be denied and the final 
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decree be in their favor, while if the injunction be 
granted the injury to opposing parties, even if the 
final decree be in their favor, will be inconsiderable, 
the injunction should be granted. Ohio 011 Co. v. 
Conway, 279 u. s. 813, 49 s. Ct. 256, 73 L. Ed. 972. 
"The determination of the grave constitutional 
issues presented in this cas~ should not be decided 
without a trial on the merits, Polk Co. v. Clover, 
305, U. s. 5, 59 s. Ct. 15, 83 L. Ed. 6, and a 
temporary injunction should be issued in order that 
the status quo may be preserved until that time." 
"To the same effect, see also Eurton, et al • .Y.!. 
L 
Matanusk~ Valley Lines, Inc., 244 F. 2d 647. 
"This, then, is another ground upon which plaintiffs 
are entitled to the immediate relief they seek. 
"For these reasons, the application for temporary 
restraining orders will be GRANTED. 
"THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Chambers, at Shreveport, 
Louisiana, on this the 12th day of July, 1959." 
Mr. President, how can we, in the face of this court order, 
extend the life of the Civil Rights Commission without violating 
the oath of each of us to uphold the Constitution? Would not 
such an extension·necessarily imply Congressional endorsement 
of the rules of the commission, and of the commission's disinclinat101. 
to act pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act? We need to 
remind ourselves that we are here to uphold the Constitution and 
represent the people of the several States -- not to vent our 
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emotions in legislation or advance our personal political 
fortunes. 
The fact that an appeal from the District Court decision 
is now pending before a three-judge court does not mitigate 
against my point, Mr. President. In fact, it emphasizes its 
validity. The court on appeal could not ignore the action of 
Congress in extending the life of the commission. Necessarily: 
and properly, the court would have to assume that Congress acted 
with full knowledge of the order of injunction. 
Mr. President, for what purpose do the proponents of this 
measure propose that Congress so flagrantly violate the 
Constitution? What is the nature of the goal which is so 
imperative that individual liberty must be trampled in the dust? 
We can only judge the proposed future of the Civil Rights 
Commission on its past actions and record. It has functioned for 
a long enough period to appraise its worth. In 1957, the proponents 
of the so-called Civil Rights Bill predicted that the commission 
would uncover the most dire and tragic situations existing in the 
field of voting rights. The record shows how wrong they were. 
As of June 30, 1959, the conunission had received a total of only 
1036 complaints, sworn and unsworn. Out of these complaints, 
on any subject within the jurisdiction of the commission, only 
254 were by sworn affidavits. 
The number of complaints in the voting field is even more 
indicative of the lack of need for the commission. Out of the 
millions of voters in this country, the commission has received 
but 315 complaints, sworn and unsworn. In my own State of 
South Carolina there were three complaints, not a one of which 
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was sworn. Even were there no constitutional question involved 
in the proposed extension of the commission's existence, we 
could not justify, from a simple policy standpoint, the expenditure 
of the funds necessary to sustain this useless agency. 
No one knows the uselessness of the commission, nor the folly 
of continuing it, better than those who served as members of the 
commission. Their statements, although guarded, indicate an 
extreme lack of enthusiasm which belies any sense of accomplishment. 
As Dr. Hannah, the Chairman of the Commission, expressed it, that 
( in the period he had tried it, he had found "there is no right 
answer to all sides 11 His attitude is evidently shared by his• 
fellow commissioners who have been reported as expressing 
reluctance to serve beyond the legal life of the Commission as 
established in 1957. 
It is obvious, Mr. President, that the attempt to extend the 
Commission is a propaganda effort, done in defiance of the 
Constitution. 
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